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This study examines whether annual financial statements filed with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission are timely sources of information for investors. We examine a summary measure, 
:he probability of bankruptcy, through which the release of financial statements might communi- 
cate information to investors. The results indicate that a significant association exists between 
revisions in the probability of bankruptcy due to nonearnings data and security returns over the 
fiscal year, but that investors have largely revised their estimates of the probability of bankruptcy 
prior to the release of the full financial statements. 
1. Introduction 
An important role of accounting is to communicate financial or economic 
data about firms to decision makers. For an accounting disclosure to be of 
direct value to decision makers, it must revise their expectations of future 
outcomes. Such ‘communication value’ can occur when firms make prelimi- 
nary earnings announcements and subsequently when firms release their 
financial statements to the public. Prior research [e.g., Beaver (1968), Morse 
(19811, and Pate11 and Wolfson (198411 indicates that earnings announce- 
ments are timely sources of information for investors. This study presents 
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evidence on whether the disclosure of full financial statements is also a timely 
source of information. 
Financial statement disclosures have been examined in previous research, 
but the detection of communication value has been limited to specific time 
periods or to a unique industry disclosure. Wilson (1987) found an associa- 
tion between returns and cash flow from operations at the financial statement 
release date. Bernard and Stober (19891, however, were unable to extend 
Wilson’s results to other years, even though they found results that are 
consistent with Wilson’s for the time period Wilson studied. More recently, 
Wahlen (1991) finds some evidence for an association between returns and 
bank loan loss disclosures for commercial banks at the financial statement 
release date. While Wilson and Wahlen provide some evidence that disclo- 
sure of financial statements can be informative, there is no evidence of 
systematic communication value of financial statements across time and 
industry groups. 
A major difficulty in evaluating the communication value of financial 
statements is that the researcher must specify whether the release of the 
statements is perceived by investors as ‘good news’ or ‘bad news’. Ou and 
Penman (1989) and Ou (1990) address this problem by using financial 
statement data to estimate the probability of a future earnings increase. In 
this study, we use financial statement data to estimate the probability of 
future financial distress. Previous studies provide evidence that changes in 
financial distress expectations have significant valuation implications and that 
the market views increases in financial distress as ‘bad news’. Zmijewski 
(1983) and Burgstahler, Jiambolvo, and Noreen (1989) establish that there is 
a negative association between unexpected changes in an index of financial 
distress which is constructed from financial statement information (the prob- 
ability of bankruptcy) and unexpected returns over the 12 months prior to 
release of the financial statements. In addition, Thompson, Olsen, and 
Dietrich (1987) provide direct evidence that financial distress disclosures 
(Wall Street Journal reports of bankruptcy proceedings, default on debt 
contracts, and restructuring of loan agreements) have a large negative impact 
on firm value. For their sample, the mean raw return on the day of the 
financial distress disclosure is - 3.4%. 
Following Zmijewski (1983) and Burgstahler et al. (19891, we use Ohlson’s 
(1980) probability of bankruptcy model to measure financial distress as 
reflected in the full financial statements.’ This bankruptcy model is chosen 
‘Although much information concerning the components of the bankruptcy probability model 
becomes known through various firm-specific press releases, interim financial statements, and 
filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission throughout the year, there is no systematic 
and complete disclosure of this information prior to the release of the full financial statements. 
Consequently, evidence of reaction to changes in the probability of bankruptcy before the annual 
financial statement disclosures in Zmijewski (1983) and Burgstahler et al. (1989) does not 
preclude additional communication when the full financial statements are disclosed. 
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for measuring the impact of the financial statements for several reasons. 
First, it is based on accounting data that are not trivially available through 
communication channels that are more timely than accounting reports. 
Second, Zmijewski (1983) and Foster (1986) indicate that there is little 
difference in predictive ability between Ohlson’s model and competing 
bankruptcy prediction models. Finally, and in contrast to alternative discrimi- 
nant function models, Ohlson’s logit model has the natural interpretation of 
a probability of bankruptcy. 
The first set of results in this paper provide evidence that nonearnings 
financial statement data are value-relevant. Excess security returns are cumu- 
lated from the beginning of the fiscal year until disclosure of the full financial 
statements, and then are regressed on contemporaneous revisions in the 
probability of bankruptcy. The total bankruptcy probability revision is parti- 
tioned into a portion which is due to earnings information and a portion 
which is due to nonearnings information. The results support the existence of 
a significant assuciation between revisions in the probability of bankruptcy 
due to nonearnings data and security returns cumulated over this long 
interval. 
The primary test in the paper is for the communication value of nonearn- 
ings information during the interval from the announcement of annual 
earnings through the disclosure of the full financial statements. First, unex- 
pected security returns cumulated over a three-day interval surrounding the 
financial statement disclosure date are regressed on unexpected changes in 
the probability of bankruptcy subsequent to the earnings announcement. The 
results for this interval provide, at best, very weak evidence of a security price 
reaction due to disclosure of the full financial statements. Second, we 
conduct a similar test during the period after the firm’s annual earnings 
announcement, but prior to disclosure of the financial statements. For this 
interval, there is somewhat stronger evidence of leakage of value-relevant 
nonearnings information. These results, together with the results for the long 
return interval, suggest that although investors react to the nonearnings 
disclosures, they have largely revised their estimates of the probability of 
bankruptcy prior to the release of the full financial statements. 
The next section discusses the sample and presents descriptive statistics. 
Section 3 establishes the value relevance of nonearnings data by testing 
whether revisions in the bankruptcy index due to nonearnings data are 
significantly associated with returns during the period from the beginning of 
the fiscal year through the release of that year’s full financial statements. The 
fourth section presents the primary results of the paper, on the communica- 
tion value of the annual nonearnings accounting disclosures themselves. 
Section 5 reports additional analyses which measure the sensitivity of the 
main results to alternative specifications of the tests. The final section 
provides concluding remarks. 
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2. Sample selection and descriptive statistics 
The sample consists of firm-years from the period 1978-1984. The begin- 
ning of the study period was chosen to avoid overlap with the years used by 
Ohlson (1980) to estimate the parameters of the bankruptcy prediction 
model. The study period ends with 1984 because that is the last year for 
which financial statement disclosure dates are available on the CRSP SEC 
Filing Date file. Firms with SIC code 6000 or higher are excluded so that the 
sample is largely from the same industries used by Ohlson to estimate the 
logit model.2 The 1988 version of the Compustat Annual Industrial file has 
4,772 firm-years listed on the NYSE and AMEX during 1978-84 with 
sufficient data to estimate the probability of bankruptcy at the end of the 
third and fourth quarters of the current year and at the end of the previous 
year. Firm-years were eliminated if quarterly earnings announcement dates 
were not available from Compustat (166 firm-years), if returns were not 
available from CRSP (1.57 firm-years), or if the earlier of their annual report 
or 10-K filing with the SEC was less than six trading days after their annual 
earnings announcement (74 firm-years). 4,375 firm-years remained in the final 
sample. 
The probability of bankruptcy is estimated each year using actual financial 
statement data as inputs to Ohlson’s (1980) ‘one or two years ahead’ logit 
model. Table 1 presents the variable names, logit model coefficient estimates, 
and variable definitions from Ohlson (1980). Table 2 presents descriptive 
statistics for our estimates of the probability of bankruptcy using Ohlson’s 
model, for all of the firm-years in our sample. The probability of bankruptcy 
is generally very low (median of 0.01621, and the distribution is skewed to the 
right as is evidenced by the fact that the mean is more than twice the median. 
Similar statistics are not reported by Ohlson, but these values are consistent 
with the results in his fig. 2 (p. 125) for the ‘one year ahead’ model.” 
3. Valuation relevance of nonearnings data 
3.1. Hypothesis 
Zmijewski (1983) and Burgstahler et al. (1989) establish that unexpected 
changes in the probability of bankruptcy are value-relevant, but they do not 
directly assess whether probability revisions due to the nonearnings cornpo- 
*Burgstahler et al. (1989) use the same industry criterion. 
“Burgstahler et al. (1989) report a mean probability of bankruptcy for their sample of 0.0386 
based on Ohlson’s ‘one year ahead’ model. Applying the ‘one year ahead’ model to our sample 
results in a mean probability of bankruptcy of 0.0193. Burgstahler et al. included Compustat 
Research firms and OTC firms in their sample, which would tend to raise the probability of 
bankruptcy relative to our sample. 
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Variables and coefficient values from Ohlson’s (1980) logit model for bankruptcy prediction, 














Log (total assets/GNP price-level index). The index assumes 
a base value of 100 for 1968. The index year is as of the vear 
prior to the year of the balance sheet date. 
Total liabilities divided by total assets. 






Current liabilities divided by current assets. 
- 4.62 
~ 3.60) 
Net income divided by total assets. 
- 2.25 
( - 3.42) 













One if net income was negative for the last two years, zero 
otherwise. 
One if total liabilities exceeds total assets, zero otherwise. 
(NI, - NI, _ , )/( I NI, I + 1 NI, ~, I), where NI, is annual net 
income for the most recent year and NI,_ , is annual net 
income for the previous year. 
Constant term. 
“The model is model 3 from Ohlson (1980, table 4, p. 121), which predicts bankruptcy within 
one or two years. 
Table 2 
Descriptive statistics for estimated probability of bankruptcy using model 3 from Ohlson (1980), 




Standard deviation 0.0773 
Minimum 0.0000 
First quartile 0.0058 
Median 0.0162 
Third quartile 0.0449 
Maximum 0.9910 
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nents are value-relevant.4 Because earnings affect several components of the 
bankruptcy index, it is possible that the association of the index with returns 
is largely explained by the role of unexpected earnings in updating the 
bankruptcy index. We control for the effect of unexpected earnings on the 
probability of bankruptcy and directly assess the impact of unexpected 
changes in nonearnings data. Our null hypothesis is: 
Hl,: Over the interval from the beginning of the fiscal year through the 
disclosure of the full financial statements, there is no association 
between unexpected returns and unexpected changes in the probabil- 
ity of bankruptcy due to changes in nonearnings numbers. 
The alternative hypothesis is that there is a negative association between 
unexpected returns and unexpected changes in the probability of bankruptcy 
due to nonearnings data. 
3.2. Methodology 
We begin by estimating investor expectations of the probability of 
bankruptcy (FYI,) at the beginning of the fiscal year. Results in Burgstahler 
et al. (1989) suggest that the annual time series of PB, is mean-reverting, so 
that 
EtJ PB,) # PB,-4, 
where EC.1 indicates expectations and time subscripts indicate the end of the 
relevant quarter.* Therefore, we use the following regression to estimate the 
beginning-of-year expectation for firm i in year t: 
PB,,, = a + bPB,,,_, + ei f. 
Estimates of a and b, based on pooled cross-sectional time-series data, are 
used to compute the expected value of PB, f for firm i based on the 
information known at the beginning of the year16 
E,_,(PB,,,) = 0.0140 + 0.6687PB+,, 
4Burgstahler et al. (1989) do explicitly control for the effect of unexpected earnings in their 
test of the relation between security returns and changes in the probability of bankruptcy. 
However, they do not explicitly control for the effect of earnings on the probability measure. We 
attempt to do that, and thereby isolate the effect of nonearnings information on the probability 
measure. 
‘Although not necessary for this section, quarterly data will be used in the next section, and 
this notation will maintain consistency between the two sections. 
6Because the regression uses realized values in estimating expectations, the expectations are 
based on hindsight. The adjusted R* for this regression is 0.427 based on 4,375 observations. 
The t-statistics for a and b are 7.48 and 12.19, respectively. All regression t-statistics reported in 
the paper are based on White’s (1980) covariance estimator. 
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so that the total estimated unexpected change in the probability of bankruptcy 
during year t for firm i is 
APBi,t = PB,,! - Er_4( PB;,,) = ei,,. 
The unexpected change in the probability of bankruptcy must be decom- 
posed into the change which is due to unexpected nonearnings data and the 
change which is due to unexpected earnings. We partition the independent 
variables in Ohlson’s probability of bankruptcy model into those that directly 
reflect earnings information, which we denote E, and those that do not, 
which we denote NE.’ Thus, the probability of bankruptcy based on the full 
financial statements for firm i from quarter t can be written as 
We then partition the unexpected change in the probability of bankruptcy 
into the portion due to nonearnings data (APBNE) and the portion due to 
earnings data (APBE) such that 





The Spearman rank order correlation between A PBE and A PBNE for our 
sample is 0.025, which indicates that the earnings and nonearnings portions 
of the unexpected change in the probability of bankruptcy are not highly 
correlated. 
The test for an association between security returns and revisions in the 
probability of bankruptcy due to nonearnings data is based on the following 
regression: 
where lJRis FY is unexpected returns cumulated from the beginning of the 
year until four days after the earlier of firm i’s annual report or 10-K filing 
‘The earnings variables (E) are INTWO, CHIN, and the numerator of NITA. The nonearn- 
ings variables (NE) are SIZE, TLTA, WCTA, CLCA, FUTL, OENEG, and the denominator of 
NITA. See table 1 for variable definitions. 
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with the SEC for year t.X LIE,,, is unexpected earnings for firm i in year t, 
which is included as a control for the relation between unexpected earnings 
and unexpected returns during the interval. UE, f is specified as the differ- 
ence between actual earnings per share before discontinued operations and 
extraordinary items for year t and the previous year, deflated by the security 
price at the beginning of year t. 
The test of the null hypothesis focuses on c3 from eq. (11, the coefficient on 
the unexpected change in the probability of bankruptcy due to nonearnings 
data, APBNE. The null hypothesis is cj = 0, and the alternative is cs < 0. 
The regression is estimated using 4,375 firm-years, which have a median 
return interval of 317 trading days and a maximum (minimum) interval of 588 
(276) trading days.” 
3.3. Results 
The results of the estimation of eq. (1) for all firm-years in the sample are 
reported in the first row of table 3. The coefficient on APBNE is negative, as 
predicted, and significant (t = - 2.651.” This supports the hypothesis that the 
nonearnings information disclosed during this return interval is useful to 
investors in revising their expectations of the probability of bankruptcy. Also 
consistent with expectations, the coefficient on APBE (c,) is negative and 
significant (t = - 3.001, and the coefficient on UE Cc,> is positive and signifi- 
cant (t = 5.77X” 
To determine the effect on the results of the small number of firms with 
large changes in their probability of bankruptcy, we successively trimmed 
firm-years with extreme values of APB from the sample. The second, third, 
and fourth sets of results reported in table 3 are for reduced samples when 2 
percent, 10 percent, and 20 percent of the sample are deleted. In general, the 
effect of trimming 2 and 10 percent of the sample is to raise the significance 
of all of the independent variables. In particular, the coefficient on APBNE 
‘Unexpected returns are computed using a procedure that adjusts each firm’s return for the 
mean return of firms of comparable size. To do this, all firms on the American and New York 
Stock Exchanges are divided into ten groups each year on the basis of their market value of 
equity on the last day of the preceding year. For each day, the unexpected return for each firm is 
the difference between the raw return of the firm and the mean return that day of the size 
portfolio of which that firm is a member. Daily returns are then compounded. 
“The %&day interval is for the Lionel Corporation’s fiscal year ending December 31, 1981. 
Lionel filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 in February, 1982, and did not file their 10-K for 
1981 until April 22, 1983. Only 16 firm-years have a return interval longer than 350 days. 
“Recall that all r-statistics reported in the paper are based on White’s (1980) covariance 
estimator. 
“Note that the firm-years overlap, so that the observations cannot be viewed as independent. 
To assess the effect of this dependence, we re-estimated the regression separately for odd and 
even numbered years. The results for both subsamples were qualitatively the same as those for 
the full sample. 
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Regression tests of relation between excess returns and unexpected changes in the probability of 
bankruptcy, fiscal year, 4,375 firms, 1978-1984.= 
Model: UR,, FY = c,, + clUEi,, + c,APBE,,, + QAPBNE,,, + u,,, 







( - 5.76) 
(0.00) 
0.404 - 1.491 - 0.850 0.084 
(5.77) ( - 3.00) ( - 2.65) 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
2 percent trimmed from sample based on extreme values of APB 
0.558 - 2.583 - 1.028 0.080 
(6.27) (- 7.78) (-3.08) 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 






1.039 - 4.650 - 1.751 0.119 
(9.50) (- 9.90) ( - 2.92) 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 





1.101 - 5.044 - 1.156 
(8.27) ( - 6.80) (- 1.16) 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.12) 





0.207 - 1.225 - 1.145 
(4.08) (- 1.96) (-3.64) 
(0.00) (0.03) (0.00) 








A PBE,. t 
0.558 -0.164 - 0.036 0.209 4375 
(23.52) (-8.15) (- 1.51) 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.07) 
= excess security return for firm i cumulated from the first day of fiscal year t 
until four days after the filing of the year t financial statements with the SEC. 
Unexpected returns are computed using a procedure that adjusts each firm’s 
return for the mean return of firms of comparable size. 
= difference between actual earnings for year t and the previous year, deflated 
by the market value of equity at the beginning of year t. 
= unexpected change in the probability of bankruptcy PB(E,,,. NE,,,) - 
E,_,(PB,,,), where E,~4(PB,,,)=0.0140+0.6687PB,,,_4. 
= unexpected change in the probability of bankruptcy due to earnings data, 
PBCE,,,, NE,,,_J - E,_,(PB, ,), where PB(E,,,, NE,,,-,) is based on current 
year earnings (E) and previous year nonearnings (NE) information and 
E,_,(PB;,,)=0.0140+0.6687PB,,,~,. 
A PBNE,, , = unexpected change in the probability of bankruptcy due to nonearnings data, 
PB(E,,,, NE,,,) - PB(E,,,, NE,,,_,) where PB(E ,.,, NE,,,) is based on current 
year earnings (E) and nonearnings (NE) information and PB(E,,,, NE, !+.+) 
is based on current year earnings (E) and previous year nonearnings (NE) 
information. 
Table 3 
White (1980) adjusted t-statistics and the probability that the coefficient estimates are different 
from zero are reported in parentheses. Probability values are based on two-sided tests for the 
intercept and one-sided tests for the slope coefficients. 
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continues to be significantly negative for these two reduced samples. How- 
ever, when the sample is reduced by 20 percent, the coefficient on APBNE is 
no longer significant at conventional levels. This indicates that the significant 
results for APBNE for the full sample are due mainly to firms with large 
unexpected changes in the probability of bankruptcy. 
To examine the relation between security returns and changes in the 
probability more closely when the change in the probability of bankruptcy is 
large, we re-estimated eq. (1) for the extreme 20 percent of the sample based 
on APB. The results for this subsample are reported in table 3. The 
coefficients on both A PBE and A PBNE are negative and significant, indicat- 
ing a strong relation between changes in probability of bankruptcy and 
security returns for this subsample.‘* 
The final set of results in table 3 is for the full sample with percentile ranks 
of the independent variables replacing their magnitudes. These percentile 
ranks are adjusted for the mean, resulting in a range of values between -0.5 
and 0.5. This specification reduces the influence of extreme observations for 
all of the independent variables in the regression. There are several differ- 
ences between the results of this ranked regression and the results for the 
full sample when the independent variables are not ranked. First, the 
explanatory power of the ranked regression is more than twice that for 
the comparable unranked regression, which indicates a nonlinear relation 
between security returns and some of the independent variables in the 
unranked regression. Second, the coefficients on UE and APBE are much 
more significant in the ranked regression. This indicates that the relation 
between returns and these variables is not linear over the whole range. 
Finally, the coefficient on APBNE is much less significant in the ranked 
regression, indicating that part of its explanatory power in the unranked 
regression is to compensate for the nonlinear relations between returns and 
UE and APBE. However, even after taking this into consideration, the 
coefficient on APBNE in the ranked regression is still negative and signifi- 
cant at the 10 percent level.‘” 
“Note that this subsample also has a very high leoel of probability of bankruptcy. The mean 
beginning-of-period probability (fBi,, _4) is 0.112, which is considerably higher than the mean 
for the entire sample (0.0413). 
13To determine the sensitivity of our results to the decomposition of the unexpected change in 
the probability of bankruptcy into earnings and nonearnings components, we repeated the 
analysis reversing the order of the updating of earnings and nonearnings information in revisions 
in the probability of bankruptcy. To do this, we let APBE,,, =PB(Ei,,,NE,,,)-PB(E,,,~,,NE,,,) 
and APBNE,,, = PB(E,,,_.4, NE,,,) - El,,-,(PB,). This alternative decomposition increased the 
significance of APBNE, , (the lowest t-statistic was -4.97) and decreased the significance of 
APBE,,, in the regressions reported in table 3. The conclusion that nonearnings data are 
significant is more strongly supported using this alternative decomposition. 
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To gain insight into the relation between changes in the probability of 
bankruptcy and security returns, table 4 reports excess returns for the same 
interval used in table 3 for portfolios formed on the basis of UE, APBE, and 
APBNE. Two analyses are reported in table 4. The first analysis, in panel A, 
reports returns for portfolios formed by separately partitioning firms into 
‘good news’ and ‘bad news’ portfolios on the basis of each of the three 
variables UE, APBE, and APBNE. Specifically, firm-years are placed in the 
‘good news’ portfolio if UE (APBE or A PBNE) is above (below) the sample 
median. The difference in returns between the two portfolios reflects the 
return from investing long in firms for which the relevant variable indicates 
‘good news’ and short in firms for which the relevant variable indicates ‘bad 
news’. The second analysis in table 4 (panel B) reports results for portfolios 
based on ‘good news’ and ‘bad news’ for APBNE after controlling for UE 
and APBE. 
For both analyses, returns are cumulated for the full return interval as well 
as for three subsets of the full return interval. The first subset is the interval 
from the beginning of the fiscal year through two days before the annual 
earnings announcement, excluding three-day intervals centered around each 
of the quarterly earnings announcements. The second subset consists of the 
four three-day intervals centered on each of the quarterly earnings an- 
nouncements. The final subset is the interval from two days after the annual 
earnings announcement to four days after the SEC financial report filing.14 
Table 4 permits evaluation of whether most of the association between 
security returns and changes in the probability of bankruptcy is due only to 
intervals immediately surrounding earnings announcements, or whether such 
an association also occurs during other times of the year. 
In panel A of table 4, the results for UE are similar to those reported in 
Ball and Brown (1968). The annual return difference between firms classified 
as ‘good news’ and those classified as ‘bad news’ based on unexpected 
earnings is nearly 30 percent. For classifications based on A PBE and A PBNE, 
the return differences are 9.2 percent and 12.2 percent, respectively, consid- 
erably smaller than for unexpected earnings but still significant at the 0.01 
level. All three variables are significantly associated with security returns 
throughout the year, both during quarterly earnings announcements and 
nonannouncement periods. However, none of the return differences for the 
interval after the annual earnings announcement are significantly different 
from zero. 
“While there are three quarterly financial statement releases during the year which are 
included in the nondisclosure windows, we would not expect those disclosure events to be 
significant if the annual financial statement release event is not. Thus, additional analysis of the 
quarterly financial statement releases is warranted only if we find something at the annual 
financial statement release date. 
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Table 4 
Cumulative excess returns for portfolios formed on the basis of UEi,,, APBEi,,, and APBNEi,,, 
4,375 firms, 1978-1984.a 
Panel A: ‘Good’ and ‘bad’ news portfolios formed on the basis of UE,,,, APB&,, and APBNE, , 
Portfoliob 
UE - ‘good’ 




APBE - ‘good’ 




APBNE - ‘good’ 












Mean excess returnsC 
EA 
































































In panel B of table 4, firm-years are assigned to one of eight portfolios 
depending on whether UE, APBE, and APBNE indicate ‘good news’ (G) or 
‘bad news’ (B) for that year. For example, a firm-year that is above the 
median UE, below the median APBE, and above the median APBNE is 
assigned to portfolio GGB. For each pair of UE-APBE control portfolios 
(GG, GB, BG, BB), table 4 presents both cumulated returns and return 
differences for firm-years that are ‘good news’ (G) and ‘bad news’ (B) on the 
basis of APBNE. When the two earnings variables both indicate ‘good news’, 
there is no apparent association between APBNE and returns after control- 
ling for UE and APBE; the return difference between GGG and GGB is 
-0.5 percent, which is not significantly different from zero. However, when 
one or both of the earnings variables indicates ‘bad news’ there is an 
association between APBNE and returns. For example, the return difference 
between the BBG and BBB portfolios is 9.4 percent, which is significant at 
the 0.01 level. Similarly, the differences between the GBG and GBB portfo- 
lios (4.9 percent) and between the BGG and BGB portfolios (5.1 percent) are 
significant at the 0.06 level and the 0.01 level, respectively. This indicates that 
investors may use nonearnings data to interpret ‘bad’ earnings news, but that 
nonearnings data are less useful for interpreting ‘good’ earnings news. 
Table 4 (continued) 
Panel B: ‘Good’ and ‘bad’ news portfolios formed on the basis of APBNE,., 
after controlling for LIE,,,, API&T,., 
Portfoliod 
(UE, APBE, APBNE) N 
Mean Pre-EA EA Post-EA 
A PBNE days days days Total 
GGG 690 - 0.007 0.119 0.041 - 0.002 0.158 








- 0.012 - 0.003 0.004 - 0.006 - 0.005 
(- 9.99) (-0.11) (0.68) ( - 0.94) (-0.20) 
(0.00) (0.55) (0.25) (0.83) (0.58) 
- 0.027 0.049 0.069 0.003 0.121 











- 0.046 0.018 0.037 
(- 15.40) (0.73) (4.57) 
(0.00) (0.23) (0.00) 
- 0.002 - 0.058 -0.017 













- 0.006 0.055 
( - 10.84) (3.80) 
(0.00) (0.00) 
- 0.012 -0.121 





















Difference - 0.050 0.079 0.014 
(t-statistic) (- 13.95) (4.56) (2.14) 




Mean excess returnsC 
“UK, = difference between actual earnings for year f and the previous year, deflated by 
the market value of equity at the beginning of year t. 
APB&,, = unexpected change in the probability of bankruptcy due to earnings data, 
PBCE,,,, NE,.Im4) - E,+&PB,,,), where PB(E,.,, NE,.1m4) is based on current 
year earnings (E) and previous year nonearnings (NE) information and 
E,_,(PB,.,) = 0.0140 + 0.6687PB,,,m4. 
APBNE,,,= unexpected change in the probability of bankruptcy due to nonearnings data, 
PB(E ,,,, NE,,,)-PB(E ,,,, NE,~1_4), where PBCE,,,, NE,,,) is based on current 
year earnings (E) and nonearnings (NE) information and PBCE, ,, NE,,Im4) is 
based on current year earnings (E) and previous year nonearnings (NE) informa- 
tion 
White (1980) adjusted f-statistics and the probability that the portfolio return differences are 
different from zero are reported in parentheses. Probability values are based on one-sided tests 
for the portfolio return differences. 
hPortfolios are formed on the basis of whether UE, APBE, and APBNE are above or below 
the sample median, respectively. The portfolio is ‘good’ news when UE (APBE or APBNE) is 
above (below) the sample median. 
‘Excess returns are cumulated from the beginning of the fiscal year until four days after the 
SEC disclosure date (Total). Three subsets of this return interval are also reported: the four 
three-day intervals surrounding each of the quarterly earnings announcements (EA days, length 
equals 12 trading days), four intervals preceding each of the quarterly earnings announcement 
intervals (Pre-EA days, median length equals 273 trading days), and the interval from two days 
after the annual earnings announcement until four days after the SEC disclosure date (Post-E,4 
days, median length equals 29 trading days). Excess returns are computed using a procedure that 
adjusts each firm’s return for the mean return of firms of comparable size. 
dPortfolios are formed on the basis of whether UE, APBE, and APBNE are above or below 
the sample median, respectively. The portfolio is ‘good’ news when UE CAPBE or APBNE) is 
above (below) the sample median. For example, firm-years in portfolio GGB are above the 
median for UE, below the median for APBE, and above the median for APBNE. 
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The timing of portfolio returns is also affected by the type of earnings 
news. When UE indicates ‘bad news’, very little of the return difference 
accompanies the quarterly earnings announcements. For the two UE ‘bad 
news’ portfolio differences reported in table 4, panel B, the average return 
difference during the quarterly earnings announcements was only about 12 
percent of the return difference during the remainder of the fiscal year. In 
contrast, for the two UE ‘good news’ portfolio differences, the average return 
difference during the quarterly earnings announcements was larger than the 
return difference during the remainder of the fiscal year. This indicates that 
when UE indicates ‘bad news’, nonearnings news is not being inferred from 
earnings announcements, but is being communicated through other means. 
Based on the results in tables 3 and 4, there is a significant association 
between the unexpected probability of bankruptcy due to nonearnings infor- 
mation, and unexpected returns. However, table 4 reports no significant 
association during the period subsequent to the annual earnings announce- 
ment for either analysis, indicating little impact due to the disclosure of the 
financial statements. In panel A of table 4, the return difference for this 
interval for UE is only 0.3 percent, and the return differences for APBE and 
APBNE are both small and negative. Similarly, in panel B of table 4 there is 
little indication of an association between security returns and disclosure of 
the full financial statements. Three of the return differences for the interval 
following the annual earnings announcement are in the wrong direction, and 
the fourth is only 0.1 percent. It is possible that the lack of association is 
partially due to the lack of power in the methodology, particularly because 
the date of disclosure is not specified precisely, and also because the 
expected probability of bankruptcy becomes more outdated as the year 
progresses. In the next section, we perform a more powerful test of the 
disclosure impact of the financial statements by identifying dates more 
precisely, and incorporating more current information into the expectations 
model for the probability of bankruptcy around the date of the financial 
statements release. 
4. Communication of nonearnings data 
4.1. Hypothesis 
Our objective is to determine the communication value of nonearnings 
accounting disclosures. To do this, we test for an association between 
unexpected changes in the probability of bankruptcy and unexpected returns 
for the three-day interval beginning the day before receipt by the SEC of 
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each firm’s annual report or 10-K, whichever is earlier.” This return interval 
is referred to as the SEC interval.16 
We also examine the period from the day after the earnings announcement 
until two days before the earlier of the firm’s annual report or 10-K filing 
with the SEC.” Disclosure may occur during this interim interval if nonearn- 
ings information leaks to the market between the announcement of annual 
earnings and disclosure of the full financial statements. This leakage could 
result from other press releases, early reports mailed to shareholders, con- 
tacts between analysts and the company, or insider trading.” 
For both the SEC interval and the interim interval, we investigate the 
following hypothesized association between changes in the probability of 
bankruptcy and security returns: 
H2,: There is no association between unexpected security returns and 
unexpected changes in the probability of bankruptcy due to nonearn- 
ings data. 
The alternative hypothesis is that there is a negative association between 
unexpected security returns and unexpected changes in the probability of 
bankruptcy. 
4.2. Methodology 
To test H2,, we must estimate investors’ expectations immediately after 
the earnings announcement, but prior to the SEC disclosure date. Three 
types of data are used to form expectations: (a) the probability of bankruptcy 
based on last year’s financial statement data PB(Ei,r_4, NE,,,_,), (b) the 
‘“The results for longer (five-day and nine-day) intervals are discussed below. 
16SEC filing dates were retrieved from the Center for Research in Security Prices SEC Filing 
Date file. For 732 of the 4,375 firm-years in our sample, only one annual report or 10-K filing 
date is available on the CRSP SEC data base. For the 3.643 firm-years in our sample that have 
both filing dates, 1,728 (47 percent) filed their annual report first, 438 (12 percent) filed their 
annual report and 10-K on the same date, and 1,477 (41 percent) filed their 10-K first. In 
addition, 1,337 (37 percent) filed their annual report within five days of their 10-K. 
“For this interval, we wish to specifically exclude the actual release of the financial state- 
ments. Using the earlier of the 10-K filing and the receipt of the annual report at the SEC 
accomplishes this. 
lXTo learn more about the sequence of firm disclosures, we sent a survey to 646 firms, a 
randomly selected subset of our sample. We received 212 usable responses. Of the responses to 
our survey, 78 (37 percent) firms indicated that they provide financial statements to shareholders 
or analysts/brokers more than three days before mailing their 10-K to the SEC. An additional 
35 (17 percent) firms indicated that, upon request, they provide analysts with actual account 
balances before disclosure of the full financial statements. Bernard and Stober (1989) report that 
27 percent of a sample of firms that responded to a written request indicated that ‘they typically 
mail a separate fourth-quarter report to shareholders prior to mailing the annual report’ 
(footnote 16, p. 632). 
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probability of bankruptcy based on third-quarter financial statement data 
PB(Ei,+ ,, NE,, 1_ ,I, and (c) the probability of bankruptcy based on the most 
recent set of information, nonearnings data from the third-quarter financial 
statements and actual earnings for the current year PB(Ei,t, NE,, f_ ,).19 
These variables are used to estimate the expected probability of bankruptcy 
after the earnings announcement, denoted EEA(PBi,,), using the following 
regression: 
Estimates of a, b,, b,, and b,, based on pooled cross-sectional time-series 
data, are used to compute the expected value of PBi,, for firm i based on the 
information known at the earnings announcement:20 
E,,( PBl,t) = -0.0008 + O.O445PB( Ei,l-d, NE,,,-,) 
-0.2964PB(Ei,t-l,NEi,,~,) 
+ 1.2646PB(E,,,,NE,,,_,). 
The new information reflected in the full financial statements is then com- 
puted as 
APBFS,,, = PB( E,,,, NE,,,) -E,,(PBi,r) =et,t. 
The main result of the paper is to test for an association between 
unexpected returns and unexpected revisions in the probability of bankruptcy 
at disclosure of the full financial statements. These tests are conducted with 
the following regression:*’ 
UR r,(SEC- l,SEC+ I) = c,) + clAPBFSi,, + u~,~, (2) 
“Our partition of the independent variables in Ohlson’s bankruptcy model into earnings (E) 
and nonearnings (NE) components is the same as discussed earlier in footnote 7. Note that 
E ,,,_i must be an annual earnings number for use in the bankruptcy index. Therefore, it is 
computed as total earnings for quarters t - 1 through t - 5. NE,,,_, are actual third-quarter 
data for all of the nonearnings components of the bankruptcy index except funds provided by 
operations, which was not generally disclosed on a quarterly basis during our sample period. 
Funds provided by operations is estimated by adjusting the relevant earnings variable (either 
E ,,,~, or E,,,) by the mean nonfund accruals for the previous five years. 
“Because the regression uses realized values in estimating expectations, the expectations are 
based on hindsight. The adjusted R* for this regression is 0.911 based on 4,375 observations. 
The t-statistics for a, b,, b,, and b, are - 1.03, 1.25, - 2.92, and 15.71, respectively. 
*‘It is possible that there is a relationship between unexpected returns and unexpected 
earnings during either the SEC interval or the interim interval that is due to post earnings 
announcement drift [see Bernard and Thomas (198911. We also estimated the regression with 
unexpected income included to control for post earnings announcement drift. This had no 
significant effect on the results. 
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where uRi,(SEC-l,SEC+l) is unexpected security returns for firm i cumulated 
from the day before until the day after the SEC disclosure date. Eq. (2) is 
also used to test H2, over the earlier interim interval, between the earnings 
announcement and the financial statement disclosure date. For this interval, 
returns are cumulated from two days after the earnings announcement until 
two days before the earliest SEC disclosure date (IL4 + 2, SEC - 2). 
The focus of eq. (2) is on cl, the coefficient on APBFS. Rejection of the 
null hypothesis (c, < 0) is consistent with value-relevant nonearnings data 
being disclosed at the time of the full financial statement disclosure [for the 
return interval (SEC - 1, SEC + l>] or between the earnings announcement 
and the full financial statement disclosure [for return interval (EA + 2, 
SEC - 211. 
4.3. Results for the SEC interval 
The results of testing H2, using the three-day interval surrounding the 
filing of the full financial statements with the SEC are reported in table 5. 
The first row reports the results for the full sample of 4,375 firm-years. The 
coefficient on APBFS, cl, is negative, but not significantly different from zero 
at the 10 percent level. Thus, it appears that in spite of the significant price 
response for the full year associated with revisions in the probability of 
bankruptcy due to nonearnings components reported in table 3, this reaction 
does not coincide with disclosure of the full financial statements. 
To determine whether this result may be attributable only to a relatively 
small number of firms with large changes in the probability of bankruptcy, we 
successively trimmed the sample on the basis of extreme observations of 
APBFS. The second, third, and fourth sets of results reported in table 5 are 
for reduced samples, with 2 percent, 10 percent, and 20 percent of the 
firm-years deleted. When the extreme 10 percent of the APBFS observations 
are deleted, the coefficient on APBFS is negative and significant at the 10 
percent level. However, when either 2 or 20 percent of the sample is deleted, 
the coefficient is not significant at any conventional level. Finally, we esti- 
mated the regression on the full sample with available data, after ranking 
APBFS. For this ranked regression, the coefficient on APBFS is negative and 
significant at the 16 percent level. At best, there is very weak evidence, 
attributable to relatively few firm-years, that there is a relation between 
security returns and changes in the probability of bankruptcy at the financial 
statement disclosure date. 
To provide some sense of the power of our methodology we conducted a 
Brown and Warner (1980, 1985) type of simulation. To do this, we chose a 
three-day nondisclosure period (SEC + 9, SEC + ll), the same length as the 
SEC interval, added (subtracted) 0.1 percent to (from) each firm-year’s return 
80 B.H. Han et al., Communication of nonearnings information 
Table 5 
















bankruptcy, SEC interval, 4,375 firms,‘l978-1984.” 
Model: UR r,(SEC~I,SEC+l) = c0 + c,APBFS,,, + u, , 
Cl Adj. R2 
All firm-years 
- 0.007 0.000 
(-0.19) 
(0.43) 
2 percent trimmed from the sample based on extreme values of APBFS 
- 0.059 0.000 
(- 0.85) 
(0.20) 








All firm-years APBFS ranked 
- 0.002 0.000 








“UR L,(SEC_ ,.SEC‘+ ,) = excess security returns cumulated from the day before until the day 
after the SEC disclosure date, which is the earlier of the annual report 
or 10-K filing date at the SEC. Unexpected returns are computed using 
a procedure that adjusts each firm’s return for the mean return of firms 
of comparable size. 
A PBFS, I = unexpected change in the probability of bankruptcy at the financial 
statement release date, PB(E,,,, NE,,,) - E,,(PB,.,), where 
PB(E,,,, NE,,,) is based on current year actual earnings and nonearn- 
ings information, E,,(PB, ,) = -0.0008 + O.O445PB(E,,,-,, NE,,,_,) 
_ 0,2964PB(E,,,_,,NE, I+1)+ 1.2646PB(E, (,NE, ,+,), where the in- 
dependent variables are: ti) the probability of bankruptcy at the begin- 
ning of the year based on last year’s data, PB(E,,,-,, NE,~,_,); (ii) the 
probability of bankruptcy based on the third-quarter financial state- 
ments, PB( E,,,- 1, NE,,, ,); (iii) the probability of bankruptcy based on 
the most current disclosed accounting information, PB( E,, , , NE,, , ~I 1. 
NE, r-1 is based on the assumption that investors know actual third- 
quarter data for all of the nonearnings components of the bankruptcy 
index except funds provided by operations, which is estimated by 
adjusting estimated earnings by the mean nonfund accruals for the 
previous five years. 
White (1980) adjusted t-statistics and the probability that the coefficient estimates are different 
from zero are reported in parentheses, Probability values are based on two-sided tests for the 
intercept and one-sided tests for the slope coefficient. 
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if APBFS for that firm-year is negative (positive), and re-estimated eq. (2). 
We continued to successively adjust each firm-year’s return by 0.1 percent 
and re-estimate eq. (2) until the coefficient on APBFS was significant at the 
5 percent level. This occurred when firms’ three-day returns were adjusted by 
0.3 percent. Thus, our test appears capable of detecting a relatively small 
return associated with changes in the probability of bankruptcy.22 
4.4. Results for the interim interL]al 
To test the null hypothesis for the interim interval, we re-estimated eq. (2) 
with unexpected returns cumulated from two days after the annual earnings 
announcement until two days before the earlier of the 10-K filing or the 
annual report filing with the SEC. The median interval is 23 days, with a 
maximum (minimum) of 288 (3) days. As before, the focus is on c,, the 
coefficient on APBFS, the revision in the probability of bankruptcy due to 
the release of nonearnings data. 
The results for the interim interval are reported in table 6, which has the 
same format as table 5. For the full sample with available data, the coefficient 
on APBFS, c,, is positive and insignificant. However, when extreme observa- 
tions are trimmed from the sample, the coefficient estimate becomes signifi- 
cantly negative. When 10 (20) percent of the sample is trimmed, the coeffi- 
cient estimate is - 0.620 (- 1.372) with a t-statistic of - 2.00 (- 2.64). In 
addition, when APBFS is ranked, the coefficient is also significantly negative 
(t = - 1.95). This provides evidence that is consistent with some leakage of 
relevant nonearnings information after the earnings announcement, but prtor 
to the official disclosure of the full financial statements. 
5. Sensitivity analysis 
In this section, we conduct two types of sensitivity analysis on the main 
results in the paper, the estimation of eq. (2) for the SEC interval. The first 
type examines the sensitivity of the results to alternative specifications of the 
disclosure interval and to alternative subsets of the data for which our 
three-day SEC interval is more likely to coincide with the first disclosure of 
financial statement information. The second type examines whether disclo- 
sure of the full financial statements is associated with security returns for 
*‘The coefficient on APBFS from eq. (2) estimated over the interval (SEC + 9, SEC + 11) was 
negative. To correct for this we employed the more conservative procedure of adjusting mean 
returns until the coefficient on APBFS was slightly positive, and then initiated the simulation. 
Under these conditions, the coefficient on AZ’BFS became significantly negative at the 5 percent 
level when returns were adjusted by 0.5 percent. For comparison purposes, we computed the 
mean return associated with positive and negative announcements of unexpected earnings for 
our sample. Firms which disclosed positive (negative) unexpected earnings at the annual 
earnings announcement experienced a three-day return of 0.6 percent t - 0.7 percent). 
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Table 6 
Regression tests of relation between excess returns and unexpected changes in the probability of 
bankruptcy, interim interval, 4,375 firms, 1978-1984.a 
Model: UR ,,(EA+Z,SEC-2) = co + c1ApBF4.t + ui.1 





























10 percent trimmed from the sample based on extreme values of APBFS 
- 0.620 0.001 
( - 2.00) 
(0.02) 
20 percent trimmed from the sample based on extreme values of APBFS 
- 1.372 0.002 
( - 2.64) 
(0.00) 




“UR I,(EA+2.SECm2j = excess security returns cumulated from two days after the earnings 
announcement until two days before the SEC disclosure date, which is 
the earlier of the annual report or 10-K filing date at the SEC. Unex- 
pected returns are computed using a procedure that adjusts each firm’s 
return for the mean return of firms of comparable size. 
APBFS,,, = unexpected change in the probability of bankruptcy at the financial 
statement release date, PBCE,,,, NE,,,) - E,,(PB,,,), where 
PB(E,, I, NE,, ,) is based on current year actual earnings and nonearnings 
information, E,,(PB,,,) = -0.0008 + 0.0445PB(E,,,-,, NE,,,_,) - 
0.2964PB(E, ,_,, NE, L_-l) + 1.2646PB(Ei,r, NE,,Im,), where the inde- 
pendent variables aref (i) the probability of bankruptcy at the beginning 
of the year based on last year’s data, PB(E,,,_4, NE,,,-,); (ii) the 
probability of bankruptcy based on the third-quarter financial state- 
ments, PB( E,, , ,, NE,, , ,); (iii) the probability of bankruptcy based on 
the most current disclosed accounting information, PB(E,, , , NE,, , _ , ). 
NE,,,-, is based on the assumption that investors know actual third- 
quarter data for all of the nonearnings components of the bankruptcy 
index except funds provided by operations, which is estimated by adjust- 
ing estimated earnings by the mean nonfund accruals for the previous 
five years. 
White (1980) adjusted t-statistics and the probability that the coefficient estimates are different 
from zero are reported in parentheses. Probability values are based on two-sided tests for the 
intercept and one-sided tests for the slope coefficient. 
B.H. Han et al., Communication of nonearnings information 83 
firm-years for which nonearnings data were more significantly related to 
returns over the entire fiscal year, due to either a large unexpected change in 
the probability of bankruptcy or negative unexpected earnings. 
5.1. Specification of the disclosure intercal 
For the tests reported in section 4, we cumulate returns over the three days 
centered on the earlier of the annual report or 10-K filing with the SEC. By 
centering the interval on the SEC date we assume that the information is 
available to investors at approximately the same time it is received by the 
SEC. When the annual report is received by the SEC before the 10-K filing, 
this assumption appears reasonable. Based on evidence in Wilson (1987), 
firms generally mail their annual reports to shareholders within two days of 
when the reports are mailed to the SEC. However, when the 10-K filing is 
received by the SEC before the annual report, the appropriateness of the 
receipt date is not as clear. Use of the receipt date as the center of the event 
interval is certainly appropriate if firms release information directly to 
investors through alternative media at the same time they file the 10-K with 
the SEC.*” On the other hand, if the SEC is the first source of the 
information for investors, the process at the SEC creates difficulty in identify- 
ing the correct date. When the filing is received, one copy goes to the public 
reference room the same day and another copy is sent to be microfiched. It is 
difficult to access the hardcopy in the public reference room because the 
filings are not organized or catalogued immediately. This potential for delay 
in physical availability is exacerbated for much of the sample by the large 
number of 12/31 10-K filings received over a relatively short interval.24 
It is possible that the lack of results for the SEC interval could be due to 
an inaccurate specification of the event date. To address this uncertainty, we 
conducted several supplementary analyses. First, we repeated our main 
analysis using five- and nine-day return intervals centered on the SEC 
disclosure date. If the event date is measured with substantial uncertainty 
such that expanding the return interval improves the signal to noise ratio, our 
results should be stronger for these intervals. However, the results are 
weaker when the return interval is lengthened, regardless of how the sample 
is trimmed or whether the regression is estimated on the basis of ranks. 
Second, we performed a separate analysis for the subset of firms whose 
annual report is received by the SEC before, or on the same date as, the 10-K 
2’From our 212 usable survey responses, 134 (63 percent) indicated that they do not send their 
annual report, 10-K, or fourth-quarter report (if they prepare one) to either shareholders or 
analysts/brokers more than three days before mailing their 10-K to the SEC. 
240ur understanding of the process is based on a telephone conversation with staff of the SEC 
Public Atfairs Office. 
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is received. A three-day interval centered around this date should include the 
date that the financial statements become available to investors for this 
subset of firms. The results for this analysis are similar to those reported for 
the whole sample. For this subsample, the coefficient on APBFS is not 
significantly negative at the 10 percent level regardless of how the sample is 
trimmed or whether the regression is estimated on the basis of ranks. 
Third, to identify firms for which the SEC date is likely to be a reasonable 
estimate of the first day the financial statements are publicly available, we 
sent a survey to a randomly selected subset of half of the firms in our sample, 
requesting information about each firm’s financial statement dissemination 
policy. We sent out 646 surveys and received 212 usable responses. Of these, 
134 firms, representing 482 firm-years in our sample, indicated that they did 
not mail their annual report or form 10-K (or fourth-quarter report if they 
prepare one) to either shareholders or analysts more than three days before 
they mail it to the SEC. We re-estimated eq. (2) for this subsample and 
obtained some weak evidence consistent with rejection of the null hypothesis. 
For this subsample, when 10 percent of the sample is trimmed, the coefficient 
on APBFS is significantly negative at the 10 percent level. In addition, when 
the regression is estimated on the basis of ranks, the coefficient on APBFS is 
significantly negative at the 5 percent level. 
5.2. Selected subsets of the sample 
The results from table 3 indicated that nonearnings information had the 
most explanatory power when the unexpected change in the probability of 
bankruptcy was large. To examine this more closely, we re-estimated eq. (2) 
for the extreme 20 percent of the APB distribution. For this subsample, the 
coefficient estimate on APBFS was virtually zero (t = 0.19). Thus, there is no 
evidence for this subsample that the security price reaction documented in 
table 3 occurred at the disclosure of the full financial statements. 
The results from table 4 in section 3 indicated that nonearnings informa- 
tion had the most explanatory power when unexpected earnings was negative. 
To examine this more closely, we re-estimated eq. (2) for firms with negative 
unexpected earnings. For this subsample, the coefficient on APBFS is not 
significantly negative at the 10 percent level regardless of how the sample is 
trimmed or whether the regression is estimated on the basis of ranks. 
5. Conclusions 
The objective of this study is to examine the communication value of 
accounting disclosures of information other than earnings. To examine this 
issue, we conducted tests for an association between security returns and 
revisions in investor estimates of the probability of bankruptcy that are due 
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to nonearnings information. We estimated the association of unexpected 
changes in the probability of bankruptcy with security returns over three 
return intervals, one to establish the potential value of nonearnings informa- 
tion and the other two to focus on disclosure of the full financial statements. 
The first interval is the period from the beginning of the fiscal year until 
the disclosure of the full financial statements. The results for this period 
support the existence of an association between changes in the probability of 
bankruptcy due to nonearnings information and security returns, after con- 
trolling for the relation between unexpected earnings and returns and the 
effect of earnings changes on the probability of bankruptcy. The results are 
particularly strong for those firm-years that had the largest change in the 
probability of bankruptcy. This indicates that nonearnings information about 
the probability of bankruptcy is useful to investors and that the disclosure of 
such information at the SEC filing date has potential communication value. 
For the period surrounding the SEC disclosure date, there is, at best, very 
weak evidence that investors receive information that is useful in adjusting 
their estimates of the probability of bankruptcy. In addition, there is some 
evidence that during the period between the earnings announcement and the 
SEC disclosure date useful information is communicated. However, the 
disclosure impact during the financial statement release period does not 
appear to be either strong or systematic. Disclosure impact of annual 
financial statements may be more likely to occur in specific time periods 
[Wilson (1987)] or industries [Wahlen (1991)]. Wahlen concludes that he was 
able to detect some communication value at the financial statement release 
date because of the specific industry context he was examining (loan loss 
information in the banking industry). In summary, our analysis indicates that 
almost all of the information contained in annual financial statement disclo- 
sures that are required by the SEC is impounded in security prices before the 
financial statements are filed with the SEC. 
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